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Neural underpinnings of morality are not yet well understood. Researchers in moral
neuroscience have tried to find specific structures and processes that shed light on
how morality works. Here, we review the main brain areas that have been associated
with morality at both structural and functional levels and speculate about how it can be
studied. Orbital and ventromedial prefrontal cortices are implicated in emotionally-driven
moral decisions, while dorsolateral prefrontal cortex appears to moderate its response.
These competing processes may be mediated by the anterior cingulate cortex. Parietal
and temporal structures play important roles in the attribution of others’ beliefs and
intentions. The insular cortex is engaged during empathic processes. Other regions seem
to play a more complementary role in morality. Morality is supported not by a single brain
circuitry or structure, but by several circuits overlapping with other complex processes.
The identification of the core features of morality and moral-related processes is needed.
Neuroscience can provide meaningful insights in order to delineate the boundaries of
morality in conjunction with moral psychology.
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“By four-thirty in the morning the priest was all cleaned up. I felt a
lot better. I always did, after. Killingmakesme feel good. (. . . ) It’s a
sweet release, a necessary letting go of all the little hydraulic valves
inside. (. . . ) It has to be done the right way, at the right time, with
the right partner—very complicated, but very necessary.”
Dexter, Darkly dreaming Dexter (Jeff Lindsay)
Can immoral behavior sometimes turn out to be moral? What
mechanisms underlie morality? The above quotation is taken
from a scene in the American TV series “Dexter.” Dexter is a
respected employee at the Miami Metro Police Department, and
a family man. However, at night Dexter doubles as a covert
serial killer, applying his own moral code and murdering assas-
sins whom the legal system has failed to condemn or catch. To
what extent can a murder be considered necessary or even moral?
Dexter’s code includes clear examples of moral paradoxes that
are not yet well understood. Does Dexter’s brain work in the
same way as the brains of other people? Researchers in moral
neuroscience have tried to find domain-specific structures and
processes that shed light on what morality is and where it is in
the brain, if in fact it is there at all.
In this article, we focus on the history of the scientific study
of neuroscience and the ways in which it has approached moral-
ity. We briefly review the main brain areas that have recently been
associated with morality at both structural and functional levels
and then discuss some of the implications of our review. We also
speculate about how morality can be studied from the point of
view of neuroscience. Here, we did a comprehensive review based
on database search and references’ search complemented with
Neurosynth as a tool to conduct reverse and forward inferences
(Yarkoni et al., 2011).
WHAT IS MORALITY?
Morality has traditionally been regarded as a code of values guid-
ing the choices and actions that determine the purpose and the
course of our lives (Rand, 1964). Recently, it has been opera-
tionalized as a code of conduct that, given specified conditions,
would be put forward by all rational persons (Gert, 2012). From
a scientific point of view, the studies by Kohlberg represented a
milestone in the psychological study of morality (Kohlberg, 1963,
1984). Kohlberg considered moral reasoning to be a result of cog-
nitive processes that may exist even in the absence of any kind of
emotions. However, findings in evolutionary psychology (Trivers,
1971; Pinker, 1997) and primatology (Flack and de Waal, 2000)
suggested that emotions played a key part in the origins of human
morality (e.g., kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, revenge).
Today, there is a general consensus in psychology and phi-
losophy in favor of the differentiation of moral processes into
two different classes: (1) rational, effortful and explicit, and
(2) emotional, quick and intuitive (De Neys and Glumicic,
2008). The controversy remains, though, in how they inter-
act. Among current models of moral processes and how they
relate to each other, three distinct theories outstand (Greene
and Haidt, 2002; Moll and Schulkin, 2009). The “social intu-
itionist theory” (Haidt, 2001) links research on automaticity
(Bargh and Chartrand, 1999) to recent findings in neuroscience
and evolutionary psychology. The “cognitive control and con-
flict theory” (Greene et al., 2004) postulates that responses
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FIGURE 1 | Density of moral neuroscience studies. The intensity of the color is proportional to the number of the citations of the corresponding region in the
article.
arising from emotion-related brain areas favor one outcome,
while cognitive responses favor a different one (Kahneman and
Frederick, 2007; McClure et al., 2007). According to the “cog-
nitive and emotional integration theory,” behavioral choices can-
not be split into cognitive vs. emotional. Complex contextual
situations can make behavioral decisions exceptionally difficult
(Gottfried, 1999; Moll et al., 2003).
HOW CANMORALITY BE STUDIED SCIENTIFICALLY?
A variety of methods for exploring morality have been developed,
from moral vs. non-moral situations to moral dilemmas (Young
and Dungan, 2012). Moral dilemmas are situations in which
every possible course of action breaches some otherwise bind-
ing moral principle (Thomson, 1985). The two main distinctions
between moral dilemmas and judgments that have traditionally
been taken into account are: (1) personal dilemmas and judg-
ments, as opposed to impersonal ones (Greene et al., 2004);
(2) utilitarian moral judgments vs. non-utilitarian ones (Brink,
1986).
These distinctions have led to the development of a variety
of paradigms. Probably the most famous ones are the trol-
ley paradigm (Thomson, 1985) and the footbridge dilemma
(Navarrete et al., 2012). In both the trolley problem and the
footbridge dilemma, the choice is between saving five peo-
ple at the expense of killing one person or letting five die
and one survive (Hauser, 2006; Greene, 2007). However, the
latter meets the criteria of a personal dilemma, while the for-
mer does not (for extensive reviews of similar moral dilem-
mas, see Greene et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007; Decety
et al., 2011; Pujol et al., 2011). Other tasks that bring morality
under experimental scrutiny present visual sentences or pictures
(Greene et al., 2001; Harenski and Hamaan, 2006), or scales
and questionnaires that can be used to assess moral behav-
ior from a clinical point of view (see Rush et al., 2008 for a
review).
THE NEUROANATOMY OF MORALITY
Being a highly complex process, morality involves a highly com-
plex neural circuitry. In this section we overview the main brain
areas and circuitry that have been associated with it. The “moral
brain” comprises a large functional network that includes several
brain structures. At the same time, many of these structures over-
lap with other regions that control different behavioral processes.
We will review them in the following order: (1) the frontal lobe,
(2) the parietal lobe, (3) the temporal lobe and insula, and (4) the
subcortical structures. The findings are summarized in Figure 1
and Table 1.
FRONTAL LOBE
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) is consistently
engaged in moral judgement (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al.,
2002; Harenski and Hamaan, 2006; Koenigs et al., 2007; Prehn
et al., 2008; Harada et al., 2009). VMPFC seems to play a crucial
role in the mediation of the emotions engaged during moral pro-
cessing (Young and Koenigs, 2007). Patients with VMPFC lesions
are reported to be significantly more likely to endorse utilitar-
ian responses to hard personal moral dilemmas (Koenigs et al.,
2007) and have trouble representing the abstract consequences of
their decisions (Krajbich et al., 2009). It is also involved in adher-
ence to social norms and values (Moll et al., 2005) and in the
integration of representations of others’ intentions with their out-
comes during social decision-making (Cooper et al., 2010). The
left VMPFC shows higher activation in subjects with lower moral
judgment competence when identifying norm violations (Prehn
et al., 2008).
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been associated with
morality, and has been implicated in the on-line representation
of reward and punishment (O’Doherty et al., 2001; Shenhav and
Greene, 2010). The right medial OFC was found to be activated
during passive viewing of moral stimuli compared with non-
moral stimuli (Harenski and Hamaan, 2006), while the activation
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of the left OFC has been related to processing of emotionally
salient statements with moral value (Moll et al., 2002). Greene
et al. (2004) speculated that the orbital and ventromedial pre-
frontal cortices seem to be involved in emotionally driven moral
decisions, whereas the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
competes with it, eventually mitigating its responses (Greene
et al., 2004). The DLPFC is differentially activated when subjects
emit a utilitarian response (Young and Koenigs, 2007). This area is
involved in cognitive control and problem-solving (Greene et al.,
2004). The DLPFC plays an important role during the judgment
of responsibility for crimes and its punishment from a third-party
perspective (Haushofer and Fehr, 2008), and also in the analysis of
situations that demand rule-based knowledge (Prehn et al., 2008).
Greene and Paxton (2009) related it to lying processes, and others
have hypothesized that it may trigger an executive function used
to combine predictions based on social norms with inferences
about the intent to deceive (Harada et al., 2009).
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is involved in error detec-
tion (Shackman et al., 2011). It is activated when subjects generate
a utilitarian response (Young and Koenigs, 2007). The ACC,
among others, has been implicated in theory of mind (ToM)
and self-referential tasks (Frith, 2001), and it has been involved
in moral conflict monitoring (Greene et al., 2004, p. 391). The
medial frontal gyrus is another frontal region that seems to inter-
vene in ToM, and also in other social functions relevant to moral
judgment (Amodio and Frith, 2006) and in the integration of
emotion into decision-making and planning (Partiot et al., 1995).
PARIETAL LOBE
The inferior parietal region is mainly associated with working
memory and cognitive control, and so its recruitment during
moral processing might be due to some cognitive engagement
(Greene et al., 2004; Harenski et al., 2008; Cáceda et al., 2011).
One of its functions, together with the posterior area of the supe-
rior temporal sulcus (STS) which we will review below, seems
to be the perception and representation of social information
that may be crucial for making inferences about others’ beliefs
and intentions (Allison et al., 2000) and the representation of
personhood (Greene and Haidt, 2002).
The temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) plays a key role in moral
intuition and in belief attribution duringmoral processing in oth-
ers (Young and Saxe, 2008; Harada et al., 2009; Young et al., 2010;
Moor et al., 2011; Young and Dungan, 2011). The TPJ, as well
as the precuneus, is involved in encoding beliefs and integrating
them with other relevant features of the action such as the out-
come (Young and Saxe, 2008). The right TPJ and the precuneus
are active when subjects process prior intentions, while the left
TPJ is activated when a subset of social intentions is involved
(Ciaramidaro et al., 2007) as well as lying (Harada et al., 2009).
The disruption of the right TPJ activity affects the capacity to use
mental states during moral judgment (Young et al., 2010). In the
dictator game, activation in the TPJ is associated with punishment
of the excluders through lower offers (Moor et al., 2011).
TEMPORAL LOBE
Temporal lobe is one of the main neural regions activated during
ToM tasks (Völlm et al., 2006; Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Muller
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et al., 2010). Structural abnormalities within this area have even
been related to psychopathy (Blair, 2010; Pujol et al., 2011).
One of the main temporal sub-regions involved in moral
judgment is the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Allison et al.,
2000; Moll et al., 2002; Greene et al., 2004; Harenski et al.,
2008). This structure has been understood as an initial site of
social perception (Allison et al., 2000) and has been repeat-
edly associated with emotional processing and social cognition
(Greene et al., 2004; Harenski et al., 2008). The STS has been
described as indispensable for making inferences about others’
beliefs and intentions (Allison et al., 2000). Increased activity
of this area is also observed in personal dilemmas compared
with other types (Greene et al., 2001). In the dictator game
the STS has been found to be activated when subjects applied
punishment to the excluders (Moor et al., 2011). The poste-
rior STS shows greater activity during justice-based dilemmas
than in care-based dilemmas (Harenski et al., 2008). Subjects
with lower moral judgment competence showed greater activa-
tion in the left posterior STS when identifying norm violations
(Prehn et al., 2008).
The anterior/middle temporal gyrus has been also related
to moral judgment (Moll et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004;
Harenski and Hamaan, 2006). Angular gyrus engagement has
been observed during the evaluation of personal moral dilemmas
(Greene et al., 2001; Borg et al., 2006; Funk and Gazzaniga, 2009).
LIMBIC LOBE
The posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) is known to be involved
in the processing of personal memory, self-awareness and emo-
tionally salient stimuli (Sestieri et al., 2011). It is one of the
brain regions that exhibit greater engagement in personal than in
impersonal dilemmas (Funk and Gazzaniga, 2009). Its activation
has been related to social ability (Greene et al., 2004), empathy
(Völlm et al., 2006) and forgiveness (Farrow et al., 2001), and
can predict the magnitude of the punishments applied in criminal
scenarios (Buckholtz et al., 2008).
The insular cortex is also engaged in moral tasks (Moll et al.,
2002; Greene et al., 2004). It exhibits greater activation in first-
person and other-person experiences of disgust (Wicker et al.,
2003). It is associated with emotional processing (Greene et al.,
2004), empathic sadness in young subjects (Decety et al., 2011),
detection and processing of uncertainty (Cooper et al., 2010) and
perception of inequity (Hsu, 2008).
The anterior insular cortex is involved in visceral somatosen-
sation, emotional feeling and regulation, and empathy
(Immordino-Yang and Singh, 2011). This sub-region is activated
during the experiencing of anger or indignation (Wicker et al.,
2003; Moll et al., 2005), and when perceiving or assessing painful
situations in others (Jackson et al., 2005). Its activation is also
correlated with empathy scores (Völlm et al., 2006) and with
unfair offers in a ‘ultimatum game’ (Hsu, 2008).
SUBCORTICAL STRUCTURES
The hippocampus is known to be a crucial region for the
acquisition and retrieval of fear conditioning (Tsetsenis et al.,
2007) and plays a facilitative role in inducing appropriate
emotional reactions, in self-related processing during social
emotions (Immordino-Yang and Singh, 2011) and in the
processing of emotional facial expressions (Fusar-Poli et al.,
2009).
The amygdala is a necessary structure for moral learning
(Mendez, 2006). It is involved in the evaluation of moral judg-
ments (Greene et al., 2004) and in empathic sadness during
morally-salient scenarios (Decety et al., 2011). It can predict pun-
ishment magnitude in criminal scenarios (Buckholtz et al., 2008).
Its dysfunction has been implicated in the affective deficits in
psychopathy (Blair, 2010).
Rating empathic sadness, and perceiving and assessing painful
situations has been associated with significant activation changes
in the thalamus (Jackson et al., 2005; Decety et al., 2011). Bilateral
thalamic activations are also observed when subjects are asked
to choose between following a moral rule or a personal desire
(Sommer et al., 2010).
The septum is activated while subjects make charitable con-
tributions (Moll et al., 2006) and has been associated with psy-
chopathy (Kent and Kiehl, 2006). Finally, the caudate nucleus is
activated during altruistic punishment (de Quervain et al., 2004)
and during the evaluation of morally salient stimuli (Luo et al.,
2006).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Moral neuroscience is an intricate and expanding field. This
review summarizes the main scientific findings obtained to date.
Morality is a set of complex emotional and cognitive processes
that is reflected across many brain domains. Some of them are
recurrently found to be indispensable in order to emit a moral
judgment, but none of them is uniquely related to morality.
The orbital and ventromedial prefrontal cortices are implicated
in emotionally-driven moral decisions, whereas the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex seems to mitigate the salience of prepotent emo-
tional responses. These competing processes may be monitored
by the anterior cingulate cortex, which is also crucial for ToM. The
TPJ and the STS play important roles in the attribution of oth-
ers’ beliefs and intentions. The insular cortex is engaged during
empathic processes, and seems to be in charge of the evalua-
tion of disgust and inequity. Other regions such as the posterior
cingulate cortex, the anterior/middle temporal gyrus and the infe-
rior parietal lobe seem to play a more complementary role in
morality, being recruited in order to accomplish general cognitive
processes engaged during the moral tasks proposed (e.g., working
memory or cognitive control). On the other hand, regions like
the amygdala seem to play an important role in the processing
of emotions involved in moral judgment. Some of the emo-
tions processed are more central to morality than others, but all
emotions contribute to moral judgment given specific contextual
situations.
The neural circuits of brain regions implicated in moral-
ity overlap with those that regulate other behavioral processes,
suggesting that there is probably no undiscovered neural sub-
strate that uniquely supports moral cognition. Themost plausible
option is that the “moral brain” does not exist per se: rather, moral
processes require the engagement of specific structures of both the
“emotional” and the “cognitive” brains, and the difference with
respect to other cognitive and emotional processes may lie in the
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content of these processes, rather than in specific circuits. Some
authors, though, have related morality to basic emotions such
as disgust (Chapman et al., 2009). Further research is needed in
order to uncover the relationships between basic emotions and
morality, as well as basic cognition blocks such as attentional
control (van Dillen et al., 2012).
Given that morality is a highly complex process influ-
enced by many factors, future studies should take into
account individual differences (e.g., personality, genetics, reli-
giosity, cultural and socioeconomic level) in order to under-
stand the variety of mechanisms that govern it. Genetic
factors and environmental-dependent processes during devel-
opmental stages may strengthen specific neural circuits that
process various moral dimensions (Gallardo-Pujol et al.,
submitted).
Another important constraint in moral research is the het-
erogeneity of the tasks used in different studies to assess
morality, which makes the comparison of the different results
extremely difficult. Moreover, some of the tasks proposed
barely suggest actual daily moral situations and usually require
abstract evaluation, a circumstance that may blur the results
obtained. The inclusion of innovative techniques such as
immersive virtual environments (Slater et al., 2006; Navarrete
et al., 2012) adds apparent validity to moral dilemmas
and may facilitate the generalization of results to real-life
settings.
All in all, morality is supported not by a single brain cir-
cuitry or structure, but by a multiplicity of circuits that overlap
with other general complex processes. One of the key issues that
needs to be addressed is the identification of the core features of
morality and moral-related processes. In this endeavor, neuro-
science can provide meaningful insights in order to delineate the
boundaries of morality in conjunction with moral psychology.
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